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Abstract 
Using the CO2 Capture and Storage (CCS) chain valuation framework described by Jakobsen et al.[1] we evaluated some of the 
non technical aspects of the chain that are related to technology deployment, specifically economies of scale in transport 
pipelines, different scenarios of infrastructure ownership and government involvement for funding oversized pipelines to promote 
economic efficiency. We find that benefits from economies of scale increase significantly with distance, raising the benefits of 
cooperation from sharing a larger pipeline. The difference in the NPV of costs between three small pipelines and a large one is 
984 MNOK at a pipeline distance of 100km and 6189MNOK at a distance of 700km, with the large pipeline always being more 
economic. With infrastructure ownership, if transport and sink sectors are independent from the source, different profit strategies 
need to be used with changing CO2 prices. This creates need for complicated and dynamic contracting and raises transaction 
costs, resulting in potential benefits to vertical integration. Government investment in pipeline infrastructure to build an oversized 
pipeline as a way to increase economic efficiency and overcome transaction costs corresponds with a lower discount rate and 
lowers project breakeven costs slightly, from €31.4 to €30.7. 
 
© 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved 
Keywords: CO2 chain, CCS, techno-economic analysis, transport infrastructure 
1. Introduction  
CCS has the potential to reduce man made CO2 emissions from large industrial sources consuming carbon 
containing fuels, such as fossil fuel power plants, steel production, petroleum industry etc. There has been much 
discussion of various types of CCS chains in the literature, though not always coordinated by a similar analytical 
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Source: An industrial process producing an exhaust 
stream containing CO2.  Examples are power generation, 
iron, and ammonia industries.
Capture: A separation process that separates the CO2
from the exhasut gases and delivers the CO2 at a defined 
purity and pressure.
Transport: CO2 transportation from the caputre to the 
storage site by pipelines or ships. 
Sink: Injection of CO2 for geological storage.  If the CO2
is injected into an oil field, increase and prolonged oil 
production is included.
framework, making it difficult to compare studies. Jakobsen et. al. [1] offered a common framework for economic 
CCS chain analysis, along with applied cases focusing on the effects of technology development on the economy of 
the whole chain. It was shown that the effect of technology improvements, at least in the short run, is limited 
compared to changing market conditions, such as oil price, and the level of political influence which will affect the 
CO2 quota price present in Europe. We continue this work and apply the above analytical framework to non-
technical variables of the CCS chain such as economies of scale, infrastructure ownership and political incentives. 
The objective is to show how various non-technological issues could be analyzed within the existing framework. A 
set of alternative cases is presented with details of the analysis and applied assumptions. Results are presented with 
preliminary conclusions and directions for further work. 
2. Methodology for CCS Chain Analysis 
The methodology used in this analysis is based on a framework and a tool that was developed to enable 
stakeholders and others to analyze alternative CCS chains in a consistent and systematic manner [1]. This type of 
methodology aids in identifying feasible solutions and assists the selection of the most promising options. The tool’s 
flexibility allows the user to evaluate the overall impact on the total CCS chain arising from decisions or 
assumptions made regarding individual parts of the chain and governing parameters, as for example selected 
technology for CO2 capture or quota prices. In addition, a tool based on this methodology for CCS chain analysis 
will be efficient for demonstrating the impact of achievements resulting from research on the various CCS chain 
elements. Hence, the method will serve as means for directing CCS related research to the most critical topics or the 
topics with the largest potential for CCS realization. A typical CCS chain consists of following main components: 
source, capture, transport, and storage.  
2.1.  Valuation Framework 
The analysis is built on a standard net present value (NPV) evaluation, where expected future cash flows are 
discounted at the opportunity cost of capital reflecting the project risk. Hence income and cost estimates are needed 
over the project lifetime.  
The cost of CCS takes part both as investments in CCS components (CAPEX) and operational costs (OPEX) to 
run the CCS system. The income for a CCS chain is defined as the value of the CO2 emissions avoided (not 
captured) compared to a corresponding industrial system without CCS. Since the total revenues are identical, 
independent of transport infrastructure solution (assume same number of sources), we focus on the NPV costs in this 
paper. The NPV of costs of the total value chain is the sum of the component costs: 
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 Figure 1: CCS Chain Components 
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t0 – time of investment decision 
tc – construction time [years] 
L – economic lifetime of CO2 chain [years] 
r – discount rate 
CAPEXi,t – capital expenditures for component i at time t [NOK/year] 
OPEXi,t – operational expenses for component i at time t [NOK/year] 
i = source, transport, storage 
 
The CAPEX and OPEX for each of the components are calculated based on the parameters in Table 1 below.  
 
Where all cost components, except the investment costs are treated as OPEX components. The costs assumptions 
for pipeline with diameters of 18” and 24” are based on the IPCC Special Report on CCS [2]. 
2.2. Formulation of Cases 
The focus of this work is on pipeline infrastructure and networks and the distribution of ownership of the 
pipelines.  As the potential impact of future technology improvements and fluctuations in CO2 quotas and oil prices 
were evaluated previously [1], this work does not take into account additional changes regarding technology 
improvement.  Instead, we focus on the pipeline network and the different options for building, operating, and 
owning the required pipelines. The following case studies have been analyzed: 
 
Case Study A.   Economics of Scale in a Simplified Pipeline Network
Case A1: Individual, Source-Owned Pipelines (Base Case 1, investigated over 10-700 km pipeline length) 
: In this case study, we investigate how the 
economics of scale change for different pipeline lengths by comparing the NPV of costs for different pipeline 
lengths, both with 1 large-diameter pipeline and three smaller-diameter pipelines when the transport distance ranges 
from 10 – 700 km. 
Case A2: Shared Ownership of a Single Pipeline (Base Case 2, investigated over 10-700 km pipeline length) 
 
Case Study B.  Effects of Pipeline Network Ownership and Profit Distributions
Case B1: Individual, Source-Owned Pipelines (Base Case 1) 
: We investigate different ways that 
ownership and profit can be divided among the different parts in the chain in this case study. 
Case B2: Shared Ownership of a Single Pipeline (Base Case 2) 
 
Case Study C.  Effects of Government Investment on Pipeline Infrastructure
Case C1: Shared Ownership of a Single Pipeline (Base Case 2) 
: In this case study, we investigate the 
NPV of costs for the chain if the government shares the investment on building a large pipeline infrastructure. 
Case C2: Government Shared Ownership of a Single Pipeline (Base Case 2 with government involvement) 
 
18" 24"
Economic lifetime [years] 30 Investment cost [NOK mill]
Start year for capture 2012 Decommision Cost in 2041 [NOK mill] 7000
End year for capture 2041 Electricity Consumption [mill kWh/yr] 160 5
Discount rate [p.a] 7% Natural gas Consumption[mill Sm3/yr] 160 5
NOK/USD 6.5 Steam Consumption [mill kWh_th/yr] 120 1
NOK/EUR 8.5 Other OPEX [NOK mill/yr] 100 30
Investment cost [USD mill/km] 0.6 1.0
Electricity price [NOK/kWh] 1 Transport cost [USD/tCO2/250 km] 3.3 2.0
Natural gas price [NOK/Sm3] 1.5
Oil price [USD/barrel] 25 Investment profile (year) 2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011
Steam price [NOK/kWh_th] 0.05 Percentage of investment cost: 50% 30% 20% 0% 40% 60% 50% 30% 20%
Transport
2600 4000
StorageSourceGlobal Parameters
Table 1: Global Parameters 
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The base cases consist of three exhaust streams, each containing 4.5 Mtonne/year of CO2 which are captured, 
transported and injected into one common aquifer. Figure 2 shows the base cases graphically. In both cases, the 
transport of CO2 starts in year 2012 and ends in year 2041, for a total 30 years of CO2 transportation. In Base Case 
1, three separate small-capacity pipelines, all with maximum capacity of 4.5 Mtonne CO2 per year are used to 
transport the captured CO2. Base Case 2 uses one common large-capacity pipeline, which has a maximum capacity 
of 13,5 Mtonne per year.  For simplicity we assume that the sources are close to the main pipeline so we do not 
consider the cost of transport from each source to the inlet of the large pipeline. The base cases take into account 
aquifer storage technology. 
 
 
The NPV of pipeline costs for the three-separate-pipeline base case is about 14100 MNOK and for the single-
pipeline base case about 7910 MNOK. These results imply that the CO2 quota price necessary to give an NPV = 0 
for the chains to be 37.1 and 31.4 EUR/tonne, for Base Case 1 and Base Case 2 respectively. Having established 
these base cases, it is interesting to study the impact of pipeline network design, pipeline ownership, and 
government financing of the network on the whole chain economy. In the following section the cases are described 
in detail with preliminary results. 
Table 2 presents the cost profile for base cases, as already stated, the total cost is lower for the case with a large-
capacity pipeline. This means that regardless of the CO2 quota price, and hence the total revenue, base case 2 will 
always have a higher net present value than base case 1. We have also determined that the CO2 price that will give a 
zero net present value for the case with small-capacity pipelines must be ~5.7 EUR/tonne higher than in the large-
capacity pipeline case. Having established these base cases, it is interesting to study the impact of pipeline network 
design, pipeline ownership, and government financing of the network on the whole chain economy. In the following 
section the cases are described in detail with preliminary results. 
 
  
 
 
 
Base Case 1 Source Transport Sink Base Case 2 Source Transport Sink 
NPV Cost 
MNOK) 
6959 4700 5271 NPV Cost 
(MNOK) 
6959 7910 5271 
  6959 4700    6959    
  6959 4700     6959     
Total 20877 14100 5271  20877 7910 5271 
Cost Profile 51.90 % 35.00 % 13.10 %   61.30 % 23.20 % 15.50 % 
CO2 price 
that gives 
npv = 0 
37.1 EUR /tonne CO2 31.4 EUR /tonne CO2 
 
Table 2: Summary of Base Cases 
Base Case 1:  Three separate small-capacity 
pipelines 
Base Case 2:  One common large-capacity 
pipeline 
Figure 2: Base Cases 
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3. Case Study A: Economics of Scale in a Simplified Pipeline Network  
 In general, the average cost per tonne CO2
transported decreases with the scale of 
investments. A natural monopoly occurs when, 
due to the economies of scale of a particular 
industry, the maximum efficiency of 
production and distribution is realized through 
a single supplier. Because the “indivisibility” 
of a pipeline can be seen as a natural 
monopoly, it will be better to build one large 
CO2 pipeline than to build two or more smaller 
ones from society’s perspective. This has also 
been shown in the base cases where the NPV 
for the chain with one single pipeline is greater 
than that for the three separate pipelines when 
the distance from source to sink is 700 km.  
However, for different transport distances, the 
economics of scale change such that the 
reduced cost of building a single pipeline 
becomes smaller as the pipeline distance 
decreases, as shown in Figure 3.  In this case study, we compare the NPV of costs for different pipeline lengths, both 
with 1 large-diameter pipeline and three smaller-diameter pipelines. In order for a common pipeline to function, 
regardless of the owners, contracts and agreements must be in place to secure that CO2 flow is guaranteed and 
payments are made.  If the transport distance is long (700 km in this case), the difference in NPV costs between the 
large and small pipelines is 6189 MNOK.  This substantial cost deviation implies that the challenges of establishing 
a common pipeline might be worthwhile. However, as the transport distance decreases, we see that the net 
difference in costs also decreases, and at 100 km transport distance we find the difference in NPVs to be only -984 
MNOK. Hence building a common pipeline for shorter transport distances may become less and less desirable. 
4. Case Study B: Effects of Pipeline Network Ownership and Profit Distributions 
In CCS chains, it is likely that there will be more than one owner of all the components. We want to look at 
different ways that ownership can be divided among the different parts in the chain. Each firm’s profit is thus 
dependent on both decisions regarding ownership and their profit strategies.  The NPV of costs for the pipeline, 
however, remain the same.  There are several ways to determine the distribution of total revenue of the value chain, 
and a few reasonable alternatives are presented. 
Mark-up from costs: The simplest way to put a profit on a service is to charge for the total costs plus a mark up. 
This price will be constant and independent of the CO2 value. This mark-up (q) can be a percentage of the costs, 
where .  
Mark-up as a percentage of total revenue: When the CO2 value is variable, and especially if it increases a lot, a 
constant price on a service may not be the most profitable solution for the transport or storage firms.  To compensate 
for this, it is possible to set the transport and storage prices as a percentage (z) of the total revenue of the chain. The 
profit will then be the variable revenue minus the costs. You will then also risk that with a very low CO2 value, the 
transport price might be too low to cover the real costs. Therefore, . 
Mark-up as a combination of costs and percentage of total revenue: Both of the previous profit strategies have 
their disadvantages and benefits. To reduce the risks in these cases, it is possible to use a combination instead. The 
price can be set as the costs plus a percentage (y) of the revenue where, .  
  
Figure 3:  NPV of costs for Case Study A, as a function of pipeline length 
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This will always make the firm able to cover their costs, but also they will have a price that is dependent on the 
CO2 value. 
Case B1: Individual, Source-Owned Pipelines: We have already established that in the case when one entity is 
responsible for the transport, a single pipeline will be more economical than three individual pipelines to the aquifer, 
but this requires contracts and agreements between the sources and the pipeline owner and operator.  In this case 
study, we explore the possibility that each source will own and operate its own pipeline for whatever reason, be it 
that no agreements could be made with the other sources, or perhaps the uncertainty in CO2 and oil prices led the 
sources to believe that this was less “risky.” In this design, each source with its associated pipeline has to pay a third 
of the sink price, on top of their own capture and transport costs.  
Case B2: Shared Ownership of a Single Pipeline: If contracts and agreements are indeed reached between the 
sources to build one common pipeline, what does this mean for the ownership and profit sharing?  This means that 
each of the sources have to pay one third of the transport firm’s costs. For each of the three cases we can analyze the 
different alternatives to split the revenue from the total chain, or in other words, each of the firms’ profit strategy.  
In the case where a firm separate from the source company owns the pipeline, in order to increase their profit, the 
transport firm has the opportunity to change their profit strategy to one of the other options described above. The 
firm owning the sink may also follow similar pricing strategies. Figure 3 shows the three first options applied to the 
sink and transport infrastructure. Table 3 provides a detailed explanation of how the profit curves in Figure 3 were 
calculated. In the transport profits example, percentage from total revenue (z) is 25%, the mark up percentage of the 
costs (q) is 75% and the combined solution uses a percentage of total revenue of 12%. In the sink profits graph, 
percentage from total revenue (z) is 15%, the mark up percentage of the costs (q) is 50% and the combined solution 
uses a percentage of total revenue of 6%.  
When comparing profits in this scenario to that where profits are dependent on a percentage of total revenue, it 
can be seen that up until the CO2 value reaches 50 EUR/tonne CO2, the transport and sink firms would prefer the 
constant, cost related, mark-up price. Above that price, they would want the profit to be a percentage of the total 
revenue. To compensate for this risk they could, as mentioned before, create a combined solution. For the transport 
and sink firms to be interested in a combined solution, they would want a fair percentage of the source’s revenue on  
top of their costs. The percentages chosen 
in this example, 12% and 6 % 
respectively, can be a good estimate of 
the lower limit, because it has to give a 
certain value compared to the constant- 
and variable price scenarios. The 
combined solution can look appealing to 
transport and sink firms, but we have to 
go back to the source to see how this 
solution affects their profits. Figure 4 
shows the source firm’s profits given 
different pricing strategies by sink and 
transport firms. In two of the cases 
presented below the source firms owns 
the pipeline infrastructure, large and small 
pipelines respectively, and in three cases 
sink and transport firms are independent 
and chose pricing strategies described in 
Figure 4 and shown in detail in Table 4.  
 It can be seen from the graph that the 
sources are better off owning their own 
large-capacity pipelines for CO2 values 
higher than 35 EUR/tonne CO2. If the 
negotiations between source companies 
on transport infrastructure prove difficult, 
negotiating “Mark up on Cost” contracts with independent firms or building their own pipelines is the next best 
Figure 4: Transport and source firms’ profit under different pricing strategies 
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alternative at higher CO2 prices. The combined solution, where sink and transport companies charge their costs plus 
a fraction of the source company’s profits is an attractive alternative at lower CO2 prices. Because there is not a 
consistent dominant pricing strategy for either the source or sink and transport firms, there will likely be a need for 
complex and dynamic contracting system between the firms in the chain, given high CO2 price volatility. This 
creates higher transaction costs and increases the value of vertical integration, pointing out in turn the value of 
economic policy in CO2 price stability.  
While the NPV of our chain does not become positive until the price of CO2 reaches 32 EUR/tonne CO2, it is 
important to consider firms’ interactions and strategies at all price levels given that technological learning due to 
implementation of CCS at scale will eventually reduce costs. 
 
Acronyms:  (SR = Source Revenue) (TC= Transport Cost) (SC = Sink Cost)
Source owns 
small pipes. 
Case (B1)*
Source owns large 
pipe.
Case (B2)*
Profit Strategy:
% of Source 
Revenue**
Profit Strategy: 
Combined Solution 
**
Profit Strategy: 
Markup From 
Costs**
Sink Costs 5271/3 = 1757 1757 1757 1757 1757
Sink Profits 6% of SR 6% of SR 15% of SR- (SC) 6% of SR - (SC) 50% of SC
Sink Price 
for Source
1757 + 6% of 
SR 1757 + 6% of SR 0.15 x SR 1757 + 6% of SR 
1757 + (0.5) x 1757 
= 2636
Transport 
Costs 4700 7910/3=2637 2637 2637 2637
Transport 
Profits N/A N/A 25% of SR - (TC) 12% of SR - (TC) 75% of (TC)
Transport 
Price 
for Source 4700 2637 0.25x SR 2637 +  12% of SR
2637 + (0.75) x 
2637 = 4615
Source Costs 6959 6959 6959 6959 6959
Source 
Revenues
Depends on 
CO2 price
Depends on
CO2 price
Depends on
CO2 price
Depends on
CO2 price
Depends on 
CO2 price
Source Profits
SR - (1757 + 
0.06 x SR) -
(4700) - (6959)
SR - (1757 + 0.06 
x SR) - (2637) -
(6959)
SR - (0.15 x SR) -
(0.25 x SR) -
(6959)
SR - (1757 + 0.06 x 
SR ) - (2637 + 0.12 
x SR) - (6959)
SR – (2636) –
(4615) - (6959)
Table 3: Costs summary for Case Study B: Effects of Pipeline Ownership (*Sink is independently owned from the source,  **Sink and transport 
are independently owned from the source) 
Figure 5 Source firm’s profit, depending on the CO2 price, with different 
strategies for profit distribution 
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5. Case Study C: Effects of Government Investment on Pipeline Infrastructure 
Case C1: Privately-Shared Ownership of a Single Pipeline (Base Case 2) 
Case C2: Government-Shared Ownership of a Single Pipeline (Base Case 2 with government involvement) 
 
If the government perceives that there is enough demand for a large pipeline infrastructure, they may see the 
benefits of building one large pipeline instead of three smaller ones.  If the government takes the initiative, we can 
assume that the discount rate for transport will be lower than if there is no government involvement.  Cases C1 and 
C2 can be compared to illustrate this effect, where Case C1 is the Base Case 2 as described previously, with a 
discount rate of 7%, and Case C2 is basically Base Case 2 with the government sharing the ownership of a single 
pipeline, with a lower discount rate for the pipeline investment. If we suggest a decrease in the discount rate to 5% 
from 7%, the NPV of pipeline costs is reduced to -7217 MNOK in Case C2 from -7910 MNOK in Case C1.  This 
leads to a CO2 price where NPV = 0 of 30.7 EUR / tonne CO2, down from 31.4 EUR/ tonne CO2 in the base case.  
6. Summary and Conclusion 
This work illustrates on relatively simple case studies how the proposed methodology and tool could be used in 
order to enlighten some critical issues related to CCS realization.  
From the economical analysis of the selected CCS value chains focusing on pipeline infrastructure, we can 
conclude that CO2 price is the major driving force for the realization of CCS projects and though the most efficient 
political incentive for CCS. The governmental co-founding of the transport infrastructure will not affect the overall 
NPV to a large extend, but it might be an important signal indicating how serious are the political intentions to 
realize CCS. The large-capacity pipeline would always be the most profitable if the same form of ownership is 
considered for both alternatives. However, the small-capacity pipelines can become competitive with different 
ownership and profit distribution strategies. The small-capacity pipelines might also shown to be better alternative if 
other issues will be taken into consideration than only the investment costs, such as risk and uncertainties related to 
the need for agreements and an independent operator of the common infrastructure. It will of course also be 
dependent on the geographical locations and the distances between sources and sink.  
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